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Abstract: Several pollution control regimes, including climate change policies, allow pol-
luters in one sector subject to an emissions cap to offset excessive emissions in that sector
with pollution abatement in another sector. The government may often find it more costly
to verify offset claims than to verify compliance with emissions caps, and concerns about
difficulties in enforcement may lead regulators to restrict the use of offsets. In this paper, we
demonstrate that allowing offsets may increase pollution abatement and reduce illegal pollu-
tion, even if the government has a fixed enforcement budget. We explore the circumstances
that may make it preferable to allow offsets when enforcement is costly.
When the government imposes a limit on emissions from firms in a particular sector of
the economy, regulators may allow those firms to exceed their limits as long as they purchase
enough pollution abatement in another sector to offset their own excess emissions. Allowing
offsets can reduce the cost of emissions control, extend incentives for technological change to
a broader range of economic activities, and develop capacity for pollution reduction in other
countries. EU climate policy, current regional and proposed national US climate policies,
and the US Clean Air Act all allow offsets (Broekhoff and Zyla, 2008). Offsets remain
controversial, however, especially in climate policy (Wara and Victor, 2008). The difficulty
of enforcing offsets is sometimes seen as a reason for restricting their availability.
Offsets may prove difficult to enforce for several reasons. First, pollution in the capped
sector is often from point sources, whereas offsets may include more diffuse sources that
are not easily monitored through traditional compliance inspections. For example, changes
in agricultural or forestry practices to store carbon in soils might be allowed to generate
offsets in a climate policy that caps emissions from power plants. Second, regulations may
require providers of offsets to demonstrate “additionality,” that is, that activities that create
offsets in fact reduce pollution in that sector relative to business as usual (Montero, 1999;
Bushnell, 2010). The public enforcement agency may find it costly or difficult to verify these
claims of additionality. Finally, many policies allow offsets generated abroad, which may
complicate verification and raise the costs of enforcement. For example, many offsets used
in the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) derive from hydroelectric and wind projects in
China (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2009), where corruption may pose a larger problem than in
the European capped sector.
In this paper, we study the role of offsets in a model of pollution control policy with
imperfect enforcement. The previous literature has not considered questions of desirable
market breadth with heterogeneous enforcement costs or of whether to allow firms in a capped
1
sector to claim offsets from an uncapped sector with imperfect enforcement.1 In our model,
an enforcement agency with a fixed budget must use scarce resources to detect violations by
auditing compliance claims in both a capped sector and an offset sector. Verifying compliance
is more costly in the offset sector. Making offsets available may affect both the amount of
pollution and the rate of compliance.
We find that allowing offsets can either increase pollution or increase compliance, depend-
ing on the relative difficulty of enforcement and the costs of abatement in the two sectors.
Despite a fixed enforcement budget, allowing offsets from a sector in which violations are
more difficult to detect can still improve compliance because it reduces the cost of compli-
ance for firms in the capped sector. In addition, our model reveals a benefit of allowing
offsets, rather than simply imposing a cap on the second sector. Because polluters require
monitoring in an offset sector only when they opt to provide offsets, compliance in this sector
may cost less to verify than it would if it were subject to an emissions cap.
1 The Model
A simple model of imperfectly enforced pollution limits will suffice to illustrate how the use
of offsets may yield higher levels of pollution abatement and lower levels of illegal pollution
even if it is more difficult to verify offset claims in a second sector than to enforce pollution
limits in the first sector.
Suppose the government has a budget B for enforcement of its limits on emissions on
a pollutant emitted by firms in two different sectors, sector 1 and sector 2, where B > 0.
Suppose also that the government imposes a fine f per unit of illegal pollution, where f > 0.
A per-unit fine is common in emission trading systems (Stranlund et al., 2002; Sigman,
1Stranlund and Dhanda (1999), Malik (1990), and others present formal models of enforcement of emission
trading systems without offsets. Stranlund et al. (2002), Kruger and Engenhofer (2006), and Sigman (2010)
analyze past experience with enforcement in these markets. Ohndorf (2010) considers enforcement with
heterogeneity across projects in the offset sector alone.
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2010). We assume that the government seeks to maximize total pollution abatement in
these two sectors, subject to its enforcement budget constraint. We also assume that B and
f are both fixed exogenously at levels low enough to prevent the government from ensuring
perfect compliance with its pollution limits; otherwise, the government could increase either
B or f by enough to deter all violations.
Suppose the government announces a limit on the quantity of pollution emissions per
unit of time in sector 1 and issues permits for this quantity to firms in sector 1, which can
then trade these permits. Regulated firms in sector 1 claim compliance with pollution limits
by announcing their levels of emissions, and enforcement takes the form of random audits
by the government to verify the claimed levels of emissions. If the government conducts an
audit, then it will detect a violation with certainty. Without loss of generality, we let the
cost to the government of auditing all firms in sector 1 equal unity, where B < 1, so that the
government cannot afford to audit each firm with certainty. Suppose the cost of auditing is
proportional to the number of audits, so that the cost of auditing each firm in sector 1 with
probability p1 simply equals p1.
If the government allows offsets, then a firm in sector 1 may legalize emissions that would
otherwise be illegal by paying a firm in sector 2 to abate its emissions by an equivalent
amount. If firms make offset claims, then the government also conducts random audits of
these offset claims to verify these claims of abatement in sector 2. An audit of an offset claim
is more costly to the government, however, than an audit of a claimed level of emissions in
sector 1. In particular, suppose the cost of auditing each offset claim with probability p2
equals Axp2, where x is the fraction of firms in sector 1 claiming offsets, A is a parameter
reflecting the cost per audit in sector 2, and A > 1. Thus, given the government’s budget
constraint and the cost of these two types of audits,
B = p1 + Axp2. (1)
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Finally, let ci(ai) represent the total cost of a units of pollution abatement in sector i,
where c
′
i(ai) > 0, c
′′
i (ai) > 0, and ci(0) = 0. As a simple example, assume the following
specific functional form:
ci(ai) =
1
2
Cia
2
i , (2)
where Ci > 0. Thus, the marginal cost of abatement in sector i equals Ciai.
2 A Comparison of the Policy Alternatives
Suppose that the government prohibits all emissions in sector 1. This policy amounts to a
cap-and-trade scheme in which the number of pollution permits issued by the government
equals zero. Under this policy, all pollution emitted by firms in sector 1 is illegal. Later
we consider the case in which the government instead issues a positive number of pollution
permits, and we find that this change in our assumptions has no important effect on our
results.
2.1 A Pollution Limit Without Offsets
If the government allows no offsets, then the government can maximize pollution abatement
by devoting its entire enforcement budget to maximizing the probability of an audit in sector
1. Thus, if we let p∗1 denote the probability of an audit in sector 1 under this policy, then:
p∗1 = B. (3)
Let a∗1 represent the quantity of abatement that emerges in sector 1 under this policy. Firms
in sector 1 will choose to abate their pollution until the marginal cost of abatement in sector
4
1 equals the expected fine for a unit of illegal pollution:
C1a
∗
1 = fp
∗
1. (4)
Together, equations (3) and (4) imply:
a∗1 =
fB
C1
. (5)
By assumption, the expected fine fB is too low to deter all pollution, so we have an interior
solution for the level of abatement in sector 1. Under this policy, there are no limits on
emissions in the second sector, so there is no abatement in sector 2.
2.2 A Pollution Limit With Offsets
If the government instead allows offsets, then the response of firms in sector 1 will depend on
the probabilities of audits of abatement claims in sector 1 and audits of claims of abatement
in sector 2. These probabilities will depend on how the government allocates its scarce
enforcement resources B between these two priorities. Suppose that the government can
credibly commit to allocate its resources so as to generate any p1/p2 ratio announced in
advance, perhaps because the game is repeated over an indefinite time horizon.
First, suppose the government announces that it will allocate these resources so as to
ensure that p2 < p1. Under this scenario, all polluters will claim offsets, whether they have
purchased valid offsets or not, because the government would be less likely to detect a false
offset claim than a false claim of abatement in sector 1. Given that the fine f for illegal
pollution is the same regardless of which claim a polluter makes, the polluter can minimize
the expected penalty for pollution by claiming offsets for its emissions. A relatively large
share of firms in sector 1 will claim offsets under this scenario. For simplicity, assume that if
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p2 < p1, then x is equal to a particular fraction xH , where 0 < xH < 1. We assume that firms
in sector 1 are “price takers” insofar as they emit too small a share of the pollution in their
sector to consider the effect of their offset claims on the government’s budget constraint,
expressed in equation (1), and the resulting reduction in the probability of audits, an effect
that would be a public good among polluting firms.
Under this scenario, polluters will face fp2 as the expected penalty for each unit of illegal
pollution. Firms in sector 1 will abate pollution until the marginal cost of abatement in
sector 1 equals the expected penalty for illegal pollution:
C1a1 = fp2, (6)
and the market price for offsets will ensure that the marginal cost of abatement in sector 2
also equals the same amount:
C2a2 = fp2, (7)
assuming an interior solution. As long as the expected penalty is not so great as to exhaust
all opportunities for abatement in sector 2, we will get an interior solution, and equality
(7) will hold. Given this scenario, the government would seek to maximize p2, in order to
maximize abatement. Thus, in this scenario, the government would set p2 as close as possible
to p1.
Second, suppose the government instead announces p1 < p2. Under this scenario, no
polluter in sector 1 would claim an offset unless it had a valid claim, because the government
would be more likely to detect a false offset claim than a false claim of abatement in sector
1. A relatively small share of firms in sector 1 will claim offsets under this scenario. For
simplicity, assume that if p1 < p2, then this share x is equal to a particular fraction xL, where
0 < xL < xH . In this case, polluters with excess emissions will falsely claim lower levels of
emissions and thus face fp1 as the expected penalty for each unit of illegal pollution. By the
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same reasoning applied to the first scenario, the government would set p1 as close as possible
to p2 under this second scenario.
Finally, suppose the government announces that it will audit all claims with the same
probability p, so that p1 = p2 = p. Under this policy, equation (1) implies that:
p =
B
1 + Ax
. (8)
The optimal policy under either of the first two scenarios approaches this third policy, as
p1 and p2 get arbitrarily close. The optimal choice among these three policies turns on the
value of x, because the government can maximize the probability of audits by minimizing x,
given the budget constraint expressed in equation (1). The value of x jumps from xL to xH
as the government increases p1 past p2, which also implies a discontinuity in total abatement,
which drops by a discrete amount at p1 = p2.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that if p1 = p2, then x = xL, so that the optimal
policy will be to set p1 = p2 = p
∗∗, where p∗∗ denotes the optimal probability of either audit
under a policy with offsets. Thus, using equation (8), we can express this probability as
follows:
p∗∗ =
B
1 + AxL
(9)
while keeping in mind that in reality, the government may need to keep p1 slightly below this
level and p2 slightly above it to deter false offset claims. In general, the government would
like to keep the expected penalty for false offset claims greater than the expected penalty
for false claims of abatement in sector 1 while keeping these expected penalties as close as
possible.2
2In a more complex model, firms may be heterogeneous with respect to the probability of detection in
one sector relative to the probability of detection in the other. In that case, x may increase continuously
as the government shifts enforcement resources from sector 2 to the sector 1. The government would then
face a tradeoff between equalizing the expected penalties for violations in the two sectors and deterring false
offset claims, and the optimal policy would entail a shift of enforcement resources toward the offset sector
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Under the optimal policy with offsets, firms in each sector would abate pollution until
the marginal cost of abatement in each sector equals fp∗∗. Thus, using equation (9) to solve
for the level of abatement under this policy yields:
a∗∗i =
fB
(1 + AxL)Ci
, (10)
where a∗∗i denotes the resulting level of abatement in each sector i. Using equation (10), we
can express the total quantity of abatement under this scenario as follows:
a∗∗1 + a
∗∗
2 =
fB(C1 + C2)
(1 + AxL)C1C2
. (11)
2.3 The Net Effect of Allowing Offsets
We can now see whether the net change in total pollution abatement is positive when we
allow offsets, that is, whether
a∗∗1 + a
∗∗
2 − a∗1 > 0. (12)
We can also ask whether compliance with pollution regulations improves when we allow
offsets, that is, whether the total amount of illegal pollution decreases. The total amount
of illegal pollution is simply the amount of illegal pollution in sector 1, because pollution in
sector 2 is unregulated. Thus, the net change in illegal pollution when we allow offsets equals
the net change in pollution in sector 1, which is simply the opposite of the net change in
pollution abatement in sector 1, minus the increase in legal pollution in sector 1, which equals
the increase in pollution abatement in sector 2. Thus, the net change in illegal pollution will
be negative if and only if:
− (a∗∗1 − a∗1) − a∗∗2 < 0. (13)
in order to pursue the second objective.
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Note that inequalities (12) and (13) are equivalent: the net change in illegal pollution is
negative if and only if the net change in total abatement is positive. Thus, we can answer
both questions simply by seeing whether inequality (12) holds.
Given our assumptions that f > 0, B > 0, and C1 > 0, and using equations (5) and (11),
we can show that inequality (12) will hold — and thus allowing offsets will reduce pollution
— if and only if the following inequality holds:
C1 > AxLC2. (14)
Inequality (14) is more likely to hold as either C1 increases or C2, A, or xL decreases,
holding all the other parameters constant. Thus, the difficulty of enforcement in sector 2,
as expressed by the inequality A > 1, makes the offset alternative less attractive, but this
disadvantage may be outweighed by other factors, expressed by the other three parameters:
C1, C2, and xL. For example, the offset alternative may be attractive if abatement in sector
1 is sufficiently costly relative to abatement in sector 2, so that:
C1
C2
> AxL. (15)
In that case, the increase in abatement in sector 2 will exceed the decrease in abatement in
sector 1.
An abatement cost advantage, however, is not necessary for the offset alternative to be
the optimal policy. Even if C1 = C2, for example, allowing offsets may be optimal despite
A > 1 as long as xL is sufficiently small to outweigh the higher cost of monitoring abatement
in sector 2. Thus, without any abatement cost advantage, the advantage of allowing offsets
depends crucially on xL < 1. The offset alternative would double the abatement oppor-
tunities, but it would cut the expected penalty for illegal pollution by more than half by
spreading enforcement resources too thin if AxL > 1.
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Indeed, the fact that xL < 1 may explain why the government might prefer to encour-
age abatement in sector 2 through offsets rather than simply subject sector 2 to a cap on
pollution. Suppose that sector 1 and sector 2 are identical in all respects except for the
higher costs of enforcement in sector 2: A > 1. In that case, subjecting sector 2 to the same
pollution limit imposed on sector 1 would have the same effects as an offset alternative with
xL = 1, because the government would have to threaten all firms in sector 2 with audits
in order to discourage violations by any firms in sector 2. Unlike the case with an offset
approach, there would be no gain from reducing the number of audits required to achieve
a given probability of detecting a violation. Whereas A > 1 would make it too costly to
extend a pollution cap to sector 2, a sufficiently small xL would make it worthwhile for the
government to adopt the offset alternative.
If firms in sector 1 have heterogeneous abatement costs, this heterogeneity may imply a
lower xL, which may make a policy allowing offsets more attractive to the government. If
firms have more heterogeneous abatement costs, then a given expected penalty for illegal
pollution may lead many firms in sector 1 to abate pollution completely even while other
firms in sector 1 still have an incentive to pollute more than allowed by law. A firm that
can honestly report zero emissions in sector 1 has no need to claim offsets from sector 2.
The more such firms exist in sector 1, the fewer offset claims there are for the government
to audit, and the lower xL is likely to be.
3
3 Extensions
To simplify the exposition, we have assumed that the government prohibits all emissions in
sector 1 unless the polluter can purchase offsetting pollution abatement in sector 2. We can
3In our simple model, the number of audits in sector 2 required to achieve a given p2 is a function of the
number of firms claiming offsets in sector 1. In a more general model, the cost of a given p2 may also be a
function of the number of firms in sector 2 selling offset claims. In this case, more heterogeneous abatement
costs in sector 2 may make a policy allowing offsets more attractive to the government.
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extend the model to include the case in which the government issues a positive number of
tradeable pollution permits to firms in sector 1, but there would be no significant change in
our results. As long as the number of permits is not so great as to allow the government to
obtain full compliance with its pollution regulations, the only effect of the permits would be
to legalize some portion of what would otherwise be illegal pollution. The level of pollution
would still turn on the marginal cost of abatement in each sector and the expected penalty
for illegal pollution, and the pollution permits would only remove the expected penalty
from infra-marginal units of pollution. The net effect of allowing offsets on total pollution
abatement and on the quantity of illegal pollution would still be the same.
Although we believe the general insights gleaned from our example are robust, our specific
results may change if we modify some of the restrictive assumptions made in our simple
example. For example, we have assumed that the marginal cost of abatement is proportional
to the quantity of abatement in each sector. A different functional form could make the case
in favor of allowing offsets stronger. For example, if
ci(ai) = Cia
3
i , (16)
then the convexity of the marginal cost function would imply that the decrease in abatement
in sector 1 would be small relative to the increase in abatement in sector 2, even if C1 = C2
and AxL = 1. Other abatement cost functions, however, could militate against allowing
offsets.
We have also assumed that enforcement costs are simply proportional to the probability
of detecting a violation. A different functional form could make the case in favor of allowing
offsets stronger. For example, if it instead becomes increasingly costly to increase the prob-
ability of detecting a violation, then the convexity of the enforcement cost function would
militate in favor of allowing offsets. If there is a large fixed cost of enforcement in the offset
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sector, however, then that fixed cost would militate against allowing offsets.
We have also assumed that B and f remain fixed regardless of the policy adopted by the
government. If allowing offsets were to relax the constraints on B or f instead, then that
effect would be an additional advantage to the policy allowing offsets. If allowing offsets
were to tighten these constraints, however, then this effect would militate against a policy
allowing offsets.4
4 Conclusion
We find that allowing offsets may not reduce compliance or increase pollution, even when
the government has more difficulty detecting violations in the offset sector than the capped
sector. Ease of monitoring and enforcement may be a consideration in deciding the range of
activities to allow as sources of offsets. Our results suggest, however, that this consideration
does not entirely determine the impact of offset activities on compliance. Furthermore, our
model highlights a possible advantage of allowing offsets, rather than including these sectors
in a pollution cap: the offset alternative may reduce the number of sources the government
needs to monitor and thus may reduce the burden on public enforcement resources.
4Most emission trading systems require violators to surrender allowances equal in the amount of the
violation in addition to paying a fine (Johnstone, 2005; Sigman, 2010). Such a policy effectively adds the
allowance price to the fine f . As a result, the effective fine will likely change with the availability of offsets,
which we expect to reduce the allowance price.
12
References
Broekhoff, Derik and Kathryn Zyla. 2008. Outside the cap: Opportunities and limitations
of greenhouse gas offsets. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
Bushnell, James B. 2010. The economics of carbon offsets. In Don Fullerton and Catherine
Wolfram, eds. The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, forthcoming.
Capoor, Karan and Philippe Ambrosi. 2009. State and trends of the carbon market, 2009,
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Johnstone, Nick. 2005. Tradable permits for climate change: Implications for compliance,
monitoring, and enforcement. In Climate-change policy, ed. Dieter Helm, 238–252.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Kruger, Joe and Christian Egenhofer. 2006. Confidence through compliance in emissions
trading markets. Sustainable Development Law and Policy 6 (2): 2–14.
Malik, Arun S. 1990. Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 18 (2): 97-106.
Montero, Juan-Pablo. 1999. Voluntary compliance with market-based environmental pol-
icy: Evidence from the U.S. Acid Rain Program. Journal of Political Economy 107
(5): 998-1033.
Ohndorf, Markus. 2010. Optimal monitoring for project-based emissions trading sys-
tems under incomplete enforcement. ETH Zurich Working Paper. http://ssrn.com/-
abstract=1666106.
Sigman, Hilary. 2010. Monitoring and enforcement of climate policy. In Don Fullerton
and Catherine Wolfram, eds. The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming.
Stranlund, John K., Carlos A. Chavez, and Barry C. Field. 2002. Enforcing emissions
trading programs: Theory, practice, and performance. Policy Studies Journal 30 (3):
343–361.
Stranlund, John K., and Kanwalroop Kathy Dhanda. 1999. Endogenous monitoring and
enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system. Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management 38 (3): 267-82.
Wara, Michael and David G. Victor. 2008. A realistic policy on international carbon offsets.
Stanford Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper 74.
13
